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Searchable Attribute-Based Mechanism with
Efficient Data Sharing for Secure Cloud Storage
Kaitai Liang and Willy Susilo∗ , Senior Member, IEEE

Abstract—To date, the growth of electronic personal data leads
to a trend that data owners prefer to remotely outsource their
data to clouds for the enjoyment of the high-quality retrieval
and storage service without worrying the burden of local data
management and maintenance. However, secure share and search
for the outsourced data is a formidable task, which may easily
incur the leakage of sensitive personal information. Efficient data
sharing and searching with security is of critical importance. This
paper, for the first time, proposes a searchable attribute-based
proxy re-encryption system. When compared to existing systems
only supporting either searchable attribute-based functionality or
attribute-based proxy re-encryption, our new primitive supports
both abilities and provides flexible keyword update service.
Specifically, the system enables a data owner to efficiently share
his data to a specified group of users matching a sharing policy
and meanwhile, the data will maintain its searchable property
but also the corresponding search keyword(s) can be updated
after the data sharing. The new mechanism is applicable to many
real-world applications, such as electronic health record systems.
It is also proved chosen ciphertext secure in the random oracle
model.
Keywords: Searchable attribute-based encryption, keyword
update, encrypted data sharing.

I. I NTRODUCTION
By stepping into the era of big data, Internet users usually
choose to upload their personal data to remote cloud servers
such that they can reduce the cost of local data management
and maintenance. In addition to individuals, many industries
and research institutions also follow the trend to remotely
store commercial and scientific data to clouds to enjoy highspeed data process and retrieval service. Cloud storage service,
accordingly, reveals its infinite practical and commercial potential. However, it meanwhile unavoidably encounters with
many unpredictable security and privacy challenges.
Motivation. We start with Attribute-Based Encryption
(ABE) with a significant reason that it provides fine-grained
expressiveness in data share and search. After storing data to
a cloud server, the data owner usually needs two necessary
operations: one is data searching, and the other is data
sharing.
Leveraging traditional ABE technology to encrypt data that
guarantees the confidentiality of the data, but it limits data
sharing and searching. Suppose there is a set of genome encryption, (Enc(g1 , P1 ), ..., Enc(gn , Pn ), ), which are donated
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by anonymous volunteers for medical research purpose, where
a data gi is encrypted under a policy Pi such that only a group
of researchers matching the policy can acquire the data. The
ciphertexts are stored in a remote server. To naively search a
specific encrypted genomic data, a researcher, say Alice, has to
download all the ciphertexts related to her decryption policy
PA from the server, and next to decrypt them to fulfill the
search task locally. When sharing one of her accessible data
with her colleagues, Alice has to download the encrypted data,
decrypt and further re-encrypt it under the decryption policy of
the colleagues. Another interesting behavior, which might be
done by Alice, is the keyword update for the shared encrypted
data. Consider an encrypted genomic data is with a keyword
tag (“Materials at Lab A”). After its sharing to scientists in
Lab B, Alice may choose to change its tag as (“Shared to Lab
B”). Since traditional ABE cannot support keyword update,
Alice has to modify the tags for all shared ciphertexts on her
own due to protecting the privacy of the keywords.
However, the above naive approaches do not scale well.
Because they bring additional decryption/encryption burden
to Alice who is required to be on-line all the time. The
cost for the data owner will become more cumbersome,
when the number of searching and sharing data is increasing.
Besides, the size of download data yields a challenge for local
data maintenance that definitely downgrades the advantage of
remote data storage.
Alternatively, one may allow a (remote) third party to fulfill
data search task, the re-encryption of data and keyword update
on behalf of Alice. Nevertheless, this requires the party to be
fully trusted as it is granted knowledge of search keyword
(i.e. what Alice wants to search) and given the secret key of
Alice (i.e. knowing the underlying data). The leak of the above
information seriously disgraces the privacy of anonymous
donators because the genomic data may contain sensitive
information, such as illness. Therefore, this approach is also
undesirable due to loss of privacy and confidentiality.
From the above discussions, we can see the importance
of secure searching and sharing for encrypted data in remote cloud storage scenario. Protecting the privacy of search
(including data and keyword) but also supporting efficient
encrypted data sharing in the context of ABE that is an interesting and unsolved problem in the literature. This motivates
our work. We further show some existing primitives cannot
fully solve the open problem.
Attribute-Based Keyword Search (ABKS). To hide search
contents as well as search keywords from cloud server, Boneh
et al. [6] introduced the notion of Public Key Encryption
(PKE) with keyword search, in which a user delivers a special
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token associated with keyword(s) to the server such that the
server can use the token to allocate all encrypted data with the
same keyword(s). The server, however, knows nothing about
the keyword(s) and the data. To explore the notion into the
context of ABE, Zheng, Xu and Ateniese [38] defined ABKS.
Although [38] is the most recent work in the literature of PKE
with keyword search, it fails to support encrypted data sharing
as the only way for a server to convert a given ciphertext
to another one is to obtain the corresponding secret key, i.e.
accessing the underlying data.
Attribute-Based Proxy Re-Encryption (ABPRE). To efficiently share an encrypted data with others, Mambo and
Okamoto [31] introduced PRE whereby a semi-trusted proxy
can transform an encryption of a message to another encryption of the same message without knowing the message.
To employ the notion into ABE setting, Liang et al. [26]
proposed the notion of ABPRE. Recently, Liang et al. [19],
[20] introduced new types of ABPRE with stronger security.
Nonetheless, these systems cannot achieve our goals as they
do not provide privacy-preserving keyword search.
Gaps Between ABE Keyword Search and Data Share.
Usually, an ABKS supporting keyword search does not simultaneously provide decryption service, such as [38]. This
is due to a technical limitation in the construction method of
trapdoor token (used for searching). Specifically, a trapdoor
token consists of a user’s “re-randomized” secret key. By using
this information, the token holder (i.e. a cloud server) can
easily recover the data from a ciphertext encrypted under the
decryption policy matching the key. Although the server may
use the re-randomized secret key to fulfill data sharing, the
confidentiality of the data cannot be guaranteed.
On the other hand, an ABPRE system, e.g., [19], is not
compatible with secure data search. Specifically, if we regard
an attribute as a search keyword, the privacy of the keyword
cannot be achieved as the system is built in the attribute
publicly known model. One might question that if we can
leverage existing anonymous ABE systems, such as [37], to
fill the gaps here. Nonetheless, it is unknown that if we can
employ anonymous ABE technique to yield both data share
and search as well as keyword privacy.
Our paper focuses on tackling the elusive gaps by proposing
a novel ABE system supporting keyword private search and
encrypted data sharing simultaneously.

(who specifies the keyword). The construction of the token is
somewhat similar to that of the secret key of the user. However,
the token (related to a keyword) will not enable its holder (i.e.
a cloud server) to decrypt the ciphertext associated with the
same keyword. This is a necessary requirement for searchable
encryption, i.e. a trapdoor token for a keyword cannot deliver
decryption ability to cloud server.
To achieve encrypted data sharing, we combine the resulting
scheme with the technique of ABPRE. The re-encryption is
tricky in the sense that we mask a secret key of a user with
two random factors in the re-encryption key generation phase.
One random factor is used to mask the partial decryption
value of a ciphertext so that a server cannot obtain knowledge
of data by using this intermediate value and meanwhile, the
random factor is known only by a group of valid delegatess
with appropriate decryption rights. The other random factor is
used to hide the components of the secret key such that its
knowledge will not be leaked to the server.
Our contributions are described as follows.
• We, for the first time, introduce a novel and practical
notion, searchable ABPRE. Our notion guarantees that
the keyword search ability of a ciphertext can be remained
after the sharing of the ciphertext. It is worth mentioning
that all existing public key systems with keyword search
fail to guarantee this property.
• We design a concrete searchable Key-Policy (KP)
ABPRE system satisfying the above notion. We also
prove the scheme chosen ciphertext secure in the Random
Oracle Model (ROM). The scheme is the first of its
type supporting the privacy of keyword search but also
encrypted data sharing.
• As of independent interest, our protocol supports keyword
update so that a ciphertext’s keyword can be further
updated before the ciphertext is shared with others. This
property brings a convenience to data owner (who can
gain access to the data) in the sense that the ciphertext
keyword can be freely modified based on data share
record.
• Our system has better efficiency regarding to keyword
search and decryption phases when compared to existing
systems which only support either data sharing or keyword search in the context of ABE.

A. Our Contributions
Technical Roadmap. We choose an ABE system with fast
decryption [16] as a starting point. The reason of employing
ABE is that ABE can provide expressiveness for data share
and keyword search compared to other encryption systems.
To achieve the privacy of keyword search, we first extend
the concrete ABE system [16] into the asymmetric pairings
group. Under the property of asymmetric pairings, one cannot
tell whether a given ciphertext contains a keyword or not
even he can make pairing computations from the ciphertext
components. This principle is similar with the technique of
anonymous Identity-Based Encryption (IBE). We further allow
a token related to a keyword to be constructed via an interaction between Private Key Generator (PKG) and a system user

B. Related Work
Sahai and Waters [33] introduced the notion of ABE. After
that, Goyal et al. [15] proposed a KP-ABE system, in which
ciphertexts are associated with attributes, and secret keys are
associated with access policies (over attributes). Later on,
many classic ABE systems and their variants that have been
proposed in the literature, e.g., [36], [18].
Song et al. [34] introduced the first (keyword) Searchable
Encryption (SE) system, in which full text search over encrypted data is allowable. Following the notion, many SE
systems have been proposed. The existing systems can be categorized into two types: searchable symmetric key encryption
(e.g. [10], [35]) and Searchable Public Key Encryption (SPKE)
(e.g. [6]). This paper deals with the latter case.
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Boneh et al. [6] introduced the PKE with single keyword
search. Later on, Golle, Staddon and Waters [14] proposed
an encryption mechanism supporting conjunctive keyword
search. In TCC 2007, Boneh and Waters [7] designed a more
expressive keyword search encryption for not only conjunctive
but also keyword subset/range queries. In CRYPTO 2007,
Bellare, Boldyreva and O’neill [2] proposed an efficient but
deterministic searchable encryption. Some variants of SPKE
have been proposed in the literature, such as authorized keyword search [17] and verifiable keyword search [3]. Recently,
Zheng, Xu and Ateniese [38] introduced ABKS, in which they
combine the keyword search with ABE technology. Nevertheless, none of the aforementioned SPKE systems supports
encrypted data sharing.
Following the concept of decryption rights delegation [31],
Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [4] defined PRE. PRE is classified
as: unidirectional and bidirectional PRE, and single-hop and
multi-hop PRE [1]. Our work deals with the single-hop unidirectional case. Since its introduction many works of PRE have
been introduced, e.g., [8], [27], [21], [24], [25], [23], [29].
To combine PRE with ABE, Liang et al. [26] introduced
Ciphertext-Policy (CP) ABPRE, and construed a system on top
of [11]. Luo et al. [30] proposed another system providing policy with AN D gates on multi-valued and negative attributes.
Mizuno and Doi [32] proposed a CP-ABPRE scheme which
is a bridge for ABE and IBE. Later on, Chandran, Chase and
Vaikuntanathan [9] proposed an obfuscation for functional reencryption with collusion resistant property. Recently, a new
CP-ABPRE was proposed in [22], in which the scheme is
proven in the ROM. In [20], a CP-ABPRE system was built
and proven secure against Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA)
in the standard model. In [19], a more expressive CP-ABPRE
with adaptively CCA security was constructed based on deterministic finite automata. However, the previously introduced
systems cannot provide privacy-preserving keyword search.
We compare this work with the most recent SPKE scheme
and ABPRE system in terms of functionality and security. We
leave the efficiency comparison to Section V. To the best of
our knowledge, our scheme is the first to achieve (privacypreserving) keyword search and encrypted data sharing as
well as keyword update. Our system is based on asymmetric
decisional l-BDHE assumption (which will be introduced
later), while [38], [19] rely on decisional linear assumption
and some composite order group assumptions, respectively.

TABLE I
C OMPARISON WITH [38], [19]

Sch. Keyword
Search
[38]
!
[19]
#
Ours
!

Encrypted
Data Sharing
#
!
!

Security

ROM

Pairings

CPA
CCA
CCA

#
#
!

symmetric
composite order
asymmetric

II. D EFINITION AND A DVERSARY M ODELS
A. System Definition
Definition 1: A Searchable Attribute-Based Proxy ReEncryption with Keyword Update (S-ABPRE-KU) scheme
consists of the following algorithms:
1) (mpk, msk) ← Setup(1λ , U ): on input a security parameter λ and a universe of description U , output a master
public key mpk and a master secret key msk. We will
omit mpk in the expression of the following algorithms.
2) skµ ← KeyGen(msk, µ): on input msk, and a description µ ∈ {0, 1}∗ , output a secret key skµ .
3) CT ← Enc(m, ν, KW ): on input a message m ∈
{0, 1}λ , a description ν ∈ {0, 1}∗ for the message and a
keyword KW , output an original ciphertext CT which
can be further converted.
4) τKW ← T rapdoor(msk, skµ , KW ): on input msk, skµ
and KW , output a trapdoor token τKW , which is used
to search encrypted data associated with KW .
5) 1/0 ← T est(CT, τKW ): on input a ciphertext CT under
a keyword KW 0 , and a trapdoor token τKW , output 1 if
KW 0 = KW , and 0 otherwise.
6) rk ← RKGen(skµ , ν, KW ): on input a skµ , a new
description ν and a new keyword KW , output a reencryption key rk, where µ does not satisfy ν. The rk is
used to convert an original ciphertext under ν 0 and KW 0
to a re-encrypted ciphertext of the same message under
ν and KW , where µ satisfies ν 0 .
7) CT / ⊥← ReEnc(CT, rk): on input an original ciphertext CT , and a re-encryption key rk, output a reencrypted ciphertext CT or ⊥.
8) m/ ⊥← Dec(skµ , CT ): on input skµ , and a ciphertext
CT under description ν, output a message m if µ satisfies
ν or ⊥.
B. Threat Models
We define three adversary models below including the
selective chosen ciphertext security for original ciphertext and
re-encrypted ciphertext, and the keyword privacy models.
Definition 2: An S-ABPRE-KU scheme is selective CCA
secure at original ciphertext if no PPT adversary A can win
the game below with non-negligible advantage. In the game,
B is the game challenger.
1) Init. A outputs a challenge description ν ∗ ∈ {0, 1}∗ .
2) Setup. B runs Setup(1λ , U ) and returns mpk to A.
3) Phase 1. A is given access to the following oracles.
a) Osk (µ): given a description µ, output skµ ←
KeyGen(msk, µ).
b) Otoken (µ, KW ): given µ and a keyword KW , output
τKW ← T rapdoor(msk, skµ , KW ), where skµ ←
KeyGen(msk, µ).
c) Otest (CT, KW ): given CT and KW , output 1/0 ←
T est(CT , τKW ), where τKW ← T rapdoor(msk,
skµ , KW ), skµ ← KeyGen(msk,µ).
d) Ork (µ, ν 0 , KW 0 ): on input µ, a new description
for ciphertext ν 0 , and a new keyword KW 0 , output rk ← RKGen(skµ , ν 0 , KW 0 ), where skµ ←
KeyGen(msk, µ).
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e) Ore (CT , µ, ν 0 , KW 0 ): on input an original ciphertext
CT , µ, ν 0 and KW 0 , output CT ← ReEnc(CT , rk),
where rk ← RKGen(skµ , ν 0 , KW 0 ) and skµ ←
KeyGen(msk, µ).
f) Odec (µ, CT ): on input µ and a ciphertext CT ,
output m ← Dec(skµ , CT ), where skµ ←
KeyGen(msk, µ).
In Phase 1, the followings are forbidden:
∗
• Osk (µ) for any µ satisfying ν ;
0
0
∗
• Ork (µ, ν , KW ) for any µ satisfying ν
and
0
0
0
meanwhile, Osk (µ ) for any µ satisfying ν .
4) Challenge. When A decides the phase 1 is over, it outputs
two equal length messages m∗0 , m∗1 , and a challenge
keyword KW ∗ . B outputs a challenge original ciphertext
as CT ∗ = Enc(m∗b , ν ∗ , KW ∗ ), where b ∈R {0, 1}.
5) Phase 2. Same as in Phase 1 except the followings:
a) Ore (CT , µ, ν 00 , KW 0 ): CT = CT ∗ , µ satisfies ν ∗ ,
and Osk (µ00 ) for any µ00 satisfying ν 00 .
b) Odec (µ, CT ): if (ν, CT ) is a derivative of (ν ∗ , CT ∗ ).
As of [8], a derivative of (ν ∗ , CT ∗ ) is defined as
i. (ν ∗ , CT ∗ ) is a derivative of itself.
ii. If A has obtained an rk from Ork on (µ, ν 0 ,
KW 0 ), and achieved CT ← ReEnc(rk, CT ∗ ),
(ν 0 , CT ) is a derivative of (ν ∗ , CT ∗ ), where µ
satisfies ν ∗ .
iii. If A has issued a re-encryption query on (CT ∗ ,
µ, ν 0 , KW 0 ) and obtained CT , (ν 0 , CT ) is a
derivative of (ν ∗ , CT ∗ ).
6) Guess. A outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1}. If b0 = b, A wins.
sCCA-Or λ
(1 , U ) = |P r[b0 = b] − 21 |.
A’s advantage is AdvA
Definition 3: An S-ABPRE-KU scheme is selective
CCA secure at re-encrypted ciphertext if the advantage
sCCA-Re λ
AdvA
(1 , U ) is negligible for any PPT adversary A
in the following experiment. Set an oracle set O1 = {Osk ,
Ork , Otest , Otoken , Odec } and the advantage as
|P r[b = b0 : (ν ∗ , state1 ) ← A(1λ , U );
(mpk, msk) ← Setup(1λ , U );
(m∗0 , m∗1 , KW ∗ , state2 ) ← AO1 (mpk, state1 );
b ∈R {0, 1}; CT ∗ ← ReEnc(Enc(m∗b , ν, KW ), rk);
1
b0 ← AO1 (CT ∗ , state2 )] − |,
2
where state1 , state2 are the state information, ν, KW are
chosen by A, Enc(m∗b , ν, KW ) is generated by B as well
as rk ← RKGen(skµ , ν ∗ , KW ∗ ), µ matches ν. For Osk , if
A issues µ satisfying ν ∗ , B outputs ⊥. There is no restriction
for re-encryption key queries, namely, A can obtain any reencryption key. This is the reason why we ignore re-encryption
oracle here. For decryption query, if the issued ciphertext is
the challenge one, output ⊥.
Remarks. This paper will employ a weaker notion for reencrypted ciphertext security. Here, O1 contains Ore , and
furthermore, all oracles work as in Definition 2 except that
there is no restriction on Ore , and for Odec output ⊥ if CT ∗
is the challenge re-encrypted ciphertext.

Definition 4: An S-ABPRE-KU scheme guarantees keyword privacy if the advantage is negligible for any PPT
adversary A in the following experiment.
KP λ
AdvA
(1 , U ) = |P r[b = b0 : (ν ∗ , state1 ) ← A(1λ , U );

(mpk, msk) ← Setup(1λ , U );
(m∗ , KW0∗ , KW1∗ , state2 ) ← AO1 (mpk, state1 );
b ∈R {0, 1}; CT ∗ ← Enc(m∗ , ν ∗ , KWb∗ );
1
b0 ← AO1 (CT ∗ , state2 )] − |,
2
where state1 , state2 are the state information, KW0∗ , KW1∗
are two distinct keywords. The oracles in O1 work as
in Definition 2 except the followings: for Otest (CT, KW )
and Otoken (µ, KW ), if either ν is ν ∗ or µ satisfies ν ∗ ,
B outputs ⊥. CT ∗ can be a re-encrypted ciphertext as
CT ∗ ← ReEnc(Enc(m∗ , ν ∗ , KW ), rk), where rk ←
RKGen(skµ , ν, KWb∗ ), and µ matches ν ∗ .
Remarks. We make a restriction to the adversary: if he is not
granted a decryption right to a ciphertext, he cannot make any
further keyword search for the ciphertext. To obtain a keyword
search ability, the adversary can query the corresponding secret
key, i.e. the decryption rights to the ciphertext, except for the
challenge one. This is a weaker notion compared to some
existing keyword search definitions. Nonetheless, it is practical
enough for real-world applications. In practice, if one cannot
have any right to gain access to a data, he/she should not know
what the corresponding keyword (associated with the data) is
as the keyword may be related to some information of the
data. Our definition is able to protect the confidentiality of the
data and keyword simultaneously.
III. P RELIMINARIES
A. Asymmetric Pairings
Let BSetup be an algorithm that on input the security
parameter λ, outputs the parameters of a bilinear map as
(q, g, ĝ, G1 , G2 , GT , e), where G1 , G2 and GT are multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order q, where q ∈ Θ(2λ ), and
g is a random generator of G1 , ĝ is a random generator of
G2 . The mapping e : G1 × G2 → GT has three properties:
(1) Bilinearity: for all a, b ∈R Z∗q , e(g a , ĝ b ) = e(g, ĝ)ab ; (2)
Non-degeneracy: e(g, ĝ) 6= 1GT , where 1GT is the unit of GT ;
(3) Computability: e can be efficiently computed. Note that
G1 and G2 are not the same.
B. Complexity Assumptions
Definition 5: (Symmetric) Decisional Bilinear DiffieHellman Exponent (BDHE) Assumption [5]. The decisional
l-BDHE assumption is that all PPT algorithms A given
l
l+2
2l
the vector ~y = (g, g s , g a , ...., g a , g a , ..., g a ), have an
l+1
advantage negligible in λ of distinguishing e(g, g)a s from
a random element R in GT . The advantage of A is defined
l+1
as |P r[A(~y , e(g, g)a s ) = 0] − P r[A(~y , R) = 0]|, where the
probability is taken over the random choice of a, s ∈R Z∗q ,
R ∈R GT , the generator g, the random bits consumed by A.
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By leveraging the same technique introduced in [13], we
extend the decisional l-BDHE assumption to asymmetric bilinl
l+2
2l
ear groups by giving (g, g s , g a , ĝ, ĝ a , ..., ĝ a , ĝ a , ..., ĝ a ) ∈
2l−1
l+1
G31 × Ĝ2
as input and asking for e(g, ĝ)a s ∈ GT .
Definition 6: (Asymmetric) Decisional l-BDHE Assumption. The asymmetric decisional l-BDHE assumption is
that all PPT algorithms A given the vector ~y =
l
l+2
2l
(g, g s , g a , ĝ, ĝ a , ...., ĝ a , ĝ a , ..., ĝ a ), have an advantage
l+1
negligible in λ of distinguishing e(g, ĝ)a s from a random element R in GT . The advantage of A is defined as
l+1
|P r[A(~y , e(g, ĝ)a s ) = 0] − P r[A(~y , R) = 0]|, where the
probability is taken over the choice of a, s ∈R Z∗q , R ∈R GT ,
the generators g, ĝ, the random bits consumed by A.
C. One-time Symmetric Encryption [12]
λ

We let KD be the key space {0, 1}poly(1 ) , and SY be
a symmetric encryption scheme, where poly(1λ ) is the fixed
polynomial size (bound) with respect to the security parameter
k. The encryption algorithm S.Enc intakes a key K ∈ KD
and a message M , outputs a ciphertext C. The decryption
algorithm S.Dec intakes K and C, outputs M or a ⊥.

where i ∈ [1, l], Γ is the set of distinct attributes in M
(i.e. Γ = {d : ∃i ∈ [1, l], ρ(i) = d}), and Γ/y denotes
the set Γ with the element y removed if present. Note
sk(M,ρ) implicitly includes (M, ρ).
3) Enc(m, S, KW ). Set the original ciphertext CT as
A = (m||σ) ⊕ H2 (e(g, ĝ)αs ), B = g s , {Cx = hsx }x∈S ,
D = e(tH3 (KW ) z, ĝ)α̂s , E1 = f1s ,
H4 (A,B,{Cx }x∈S ,D,E1 )

E2 = (f2

f3 ) s ,

where σ ∈ {0, 1}λ , m ∈ {0, 1}λ and s = H1 (m, σ). CT
implicitly contains S.
4) T rapdoor(msk, sk(M,ρ) , KW ). The trapdoor is generated by the collaboration between a secret key holder
and the fully trusted PKG.
~
• The PKG chooses a random vector V
=
∗n
(α̂, ŷ2 , ..., ŷn ) ∈ Zq which to be used to share α̂.
~ · Mi . It further sends
For i = 1 to l, it sets φ̂i = (V)
the following values to the user
i
, τ2,i = ĝ r̂i ,
τ1,i = (t̂H3 (KW ) ẑ)φ̂i · ĥr̂ρ(i)

∀d ∈ Γ/ρ(i), τ3,i,d = ĥr̂di ,
IV. A N S-ABPRE-KU S YSTEM
A. A Basic Construction for Small Universe
We propose an S-ABPRE-KU scheme in the key-policy
attribute-based setting. Secret key is associated with access
policy, and ciphertext is tagged with attribute set. As of [16],
we use an LSSS access structure (M, ρ) to represent a policy,
U to denote an attribute universe whereby |U | is a polynomial
in 1λ . We use KW to denote either a single keyword or a
group of multiple keywords. Since KW is the input of a hash
function, if KW represents a group of multiple keywords, it
indicates that these keywords are with AND gates. We also
note that KW can be arbitrary length.
1) Setup(1λ , U ). Run (q, g, ĝ, G1 , G2 , GT , e) ←
BSetup(1λ ). Choose α, α̂, δ, 1 , 2 , 3 , βi , χ ∈R Z∗q , set
hi = g βi , ĥi = ĝ βi , t = g δ , t̂ = ĝ δ , z = g χ , ẑ = ĝ χ ,
f1 = g 1 , f2 = g 2 , f3 = g 3 , fˆ1 = ĝ 1 , fˆ2 = ĝ 2 ,
fˆ3 = ĝ 3 , i ∈ [1, |U |]. Choose Target Collision Resistant
(TCR) hash functions [12]: H1 : {0, 1}λ ×{0, 1}λ → Z∗q ,
H2 : GT → {0, 1}2λ , H3 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , H4 :
{0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , H5 : {0, 1}λ → Z∗q and H6 : {0, 1}λ →
λ
{0, 1}poly(1 ) , a CCA-secure one-time symmetric key
encryption SY = (S.Enc, S.Dec). The master secret
key msk = (α, α̂, ẑ, t̂), the master public key mpk = (g,
ĝ, {hi , ĥi }i∈[1,|U |] , f1 , f2 , f3 , fˆ1 , fˆ2 , fˆ3 , t, z, e(g, ĝ)α ,
e(t, ĝ)α̂ , e(z, ĝ)α̂ , H1 , H2 , H3 , H4 , H5 , H6 , SY ).
2) KeyGen(msk, (M, ρ)). Let M be an l × n matrix, and
ρ be the function that associates rows of M to attributes.
Choose a random vector (~v ) = (α, y2 , ..., yn ) ∈ Z∗n
q
which to be used to share α. For i = 1 to l, compute
φi = (~v ) · Mi , where Mi is the vector related to i-th row
of M . Choose r1 , ..., rl ∈R Z∗q , and set sk(M,ρ) as
i
Di = ĝ φi · ĥrρ(i)
, Ri = ĝ ri , ∀d ∈ Γ/ρ(i), Qi,d = ĥrdi ,

•

where r̂1 , ..., r̂l ∈R Z∗q , i ∈ [1, l], Γ is the set of
distinct attributes in M .
The user re-randomizes the values, and sets the
trapdoor token τKW as
i
τ1,i = τ1,i · ĥξρ(i)
, τ2,i = τ2,i · ĝ ξi ,

∀d ∈ Γ/ρ(i), τ3,i,d = τ3,i,d · ĥξdi ,
where ξi ∈R Z∗q . Note (M, ρ) implicitly includes in
the token.
5) T est(CT, τKW ). Parse CT as (S, A, B, {Cx }x∈S , D,
E1 , E2 ), and τKW as (τ1,i , τ2,i , τ3,i,d ). Suppose S
associated with CT satisfies (M, ρ) associated with τKW ,
there exists a set of constants
{wi }i∈I ∈ Z∗q so that
P
∀i ∈ I, ρ(i) ∈ S and i∈I wi Mi = (1, 0, ..., 0). Given
an original ciphertext CT associated with a keyword set
KW 0 and a token τKW , one can verify that
Q
Q
e(B, i∈I (τ1,i x∈∆/ρ(i) τ3,i,x )wi ) ?
Q
Q
= D.
wi
e( x∈∆ Cx , i∈I τ2,i
)
If the equation holds, i.e.
Q
Q
e(B, i∈I (τ1,i x∈∆/ρ(i) τ3,i,x )wi )
Q
Q
wi
e( x∈∆ Cx , i∈I τ2,i
)
Q
Q
s
H3 (KW 0 ) φ̂i r̂i +ξi
r̂i +ξi wi
e(g , i∈I ((t̂
ẑ) ĥρ(i)
) )
x∈∆/ρ(i) ĥx
Q
Q
=
e( x∈∆ hsx , i∈I (ĝ r̂i +ξi )wi )
= e((tH3 (KW ) z)α̂s , ĝ),
it indicates that KW = KW 0 so that output 1, and output
0 otherwise. Q
Similarly,
Qif CT is a re-encrypted ciphertext,
e(rk6 , i∈I (τ1,i x∈∆/ρ(i) τ3,i,x )wi ) ?
Q
Q
verify
= rk8 .
w
e(
rk ,
τ i)
x∈∆

7,x

i∈I

2,i
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6) RKGen(sk(M,ρ) , S, KW ). Choose γ ∈R Z∗q , θ1 , θ2 ∈R
{0, 1}λ , and set rk as
H5 (θ1 ) ˆγ
f1 , rk2

rk1,i = Di

H5 (θ1 )

= ĝ γ , rk3,i = Ri
H5 (θ1 )

rk4,i = ∀d ∈ Γ/ρ(i) (Qi,d )

,

,

αš

rk5 = (θ1 ||θ2 ) ⊕ H2 (e(g, ĝ) ), rk6 = g š ,
rk7,x = (hšx )x∈S , rk8 = e(tH3 (KW ) , ĝ)α̂š ,
rk9 =

?
H (T ,T ,T
)
e(T3,2 , fˆ2 4 3,1 3,2 3,3,x fˆ3 ) = e(T3,4 , ĝ) (4)

H (rk ,rk ,rk ,rk )
(f2 4 5 6 7,x 8 f3 )š ,

where sk(M,ρ) = (Di , Ri , ∀d ∈ Γ/ρ(i) Qi,d ), i ∈ [1, l],
š = H1 (θ1 , θ2 ). Note rk includes (M, ρ) and S.
7) ReEnc(CT, rk). Parse CT as (S, A, B, {Cx }x∈S , D,
E1 , E2 ), rk as ((M, ρ), S 0 , rk1,i , rk2 , rk3,i , rk4,i , rk5 ,
rk6 , {rk7,x }x∈S 0 , rk8 , rk9 ), i ∈ [1, l].
i. Check the validity of CT as
?

e(B, fˆ1 ) = e(E1 , ĝ),
Y
Y
?
Cx , ĝ) = e(B,
e(
ĥx ).
x∈S

(1)
(2)

x∈S
H4 (A,B,{Cx }x∈S ,D,E1 )

e(B, fˆ2

?
fˆ3 ) = e(E2 , ĝ).

iii. Output the message by computing m||σ =
A ⊕ H2 (e(g, ĝ)αs ) if B
= g H1 (m,σ) ,
H4 (A,B,{Cx }x∈S ,D,E1 )
E2 = (f2
f3 )H1 (m,σ) and
Q
Q
H1 (m,σ)
; else, output ⊥.
x∈S Cx =
x∈S hx
(2) If CT is the re-encrypted ciphertext,
i. Verify

(3)

If the equation does not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, proceed.
ii. Compute
Q
Q
e(T3,2 , i∈I (Di x∈∆/ρ(i) Qi,x )wi )
Q
Q
= e(g, ĝ)αs̃ .
e( x∈∆ T3,3,x , i∈I Riwi )
and
recover
S.Key
by
computing
S.Key||θ3
=
T3,1 ⊕ H2 (e(g, ĝ)αs̃ ).
Proceed if T3,2
=
g H1 (S.Key,θ3 ) ,
H4 (T3,1 ,T3,2 ,T3,3,x )
T3,4 = (f2
f3 )H1 (S.Key,θ3 )
Q
Q
H1 (S.Key,θ3 )
and
=
;
x∈S T3,3,x
x∈S hx
otherwise, output ⊥.
iii. Recover θ1 from rk5 , rk6 , {rk7,x }x∈S , rk8 and
rk9 as above.
iv. Compute CT ||Ω = S.Dec(T1 , H6 (S.Key)), and
−1
further ΩH5 (θ1 ) = e(g s , ĝ α ).
v. If Eq. (3) does not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise,
proceed. Compute m||σ = A ⊕ H2 (e(g, ĝ)αs ),
and then output the message m if B = g H1 (m,σ)
H (A,B,{Cx }x∈S ,D,E1 )
and E2 = (f2 4
f3 )H1 (m,σ) ;
otherwise, output ⊥.

If one of the equations does not hold, output ⊥. Else,
proceed.
ii. If S associated with CT satisfies (M, ρ) associated
with rk, let I ⊂ {1, 2, ..., l} be a set of indices and
{wi }i∈I ∈ Z∗q P
be a set of constants so that ∀i ∈ I,
ρ(i) ∈ S and i∈I wi Mi = (1, 0, ..., 0), and define
∆ = {x : ∃i ∈ I, ρ(i) = x}. Compute
Q
Q
e(B, i∈I (rk1,i x∈∆/ρ(i) rk4,x )wi )
P
Ω=
Q
Q
wi
wi
B. Discussions
e(E1 , rk2 i∈I )e( x∈∆ Cx , i∈I rk3,i
)
Q
Q
Trapdoor Generation. In our system, the keyword trapdoor
w H (θ )r
e(g s , i∈I ĝ φi ,H5 (θ1 )wi x∈∆ ĥx i 5 1 i fˆ1γwi )
P
is generated via the collaboration between a fully trusted PKG
=
Q
Q
e(f1s , ĝ γ i∈I wi )e( x∈∆ hsx , i∈I ĝ ri H5 (θ1 )wi ) and a secret key holder. When the key holder needs a trapdoor,
he first issues the corresponding request (with keyword(s))
= e(g s , ĝ αH5 (θ1 ) ).
to the PKG, the PKG then returns a related intermediate
iii. Compute the re-encrypted ciphertext as T1 = component. Finally, the key holder re-randomizes the compoS.Enc(CT ||Ω, H6 (S.Key)), T2 = (rk5 , rk6 , nent to become a “real” trapdoor. In our current architecture,
{rk7,x }x∈S 0 , rk8 , rk9 ), T3 = (T3,1 = (S.Key||θ3 )⊕ we assume all master secret keys (the one for secret key
H2 (e(g, ĝ)αs̃ ), T3,2 = g s̃ , T3,3,x = (hs̃x )x∈S 0 , T3,4 = generation, and the other one for trapdoor generation) are
H (T ,T ,T
)
(f2 4 3,1 3,2 3,3,x f3 )s̃ ), where S.Key, θ3 ∈R known by the PKG only. That is why the secret key holder
λ
{0, 1} , s̃ = H1 (S.Key, θ3 ).
needs a interaction with the PKG when generating a trapdoor.
8) Dec(sk(M,ρ) , CT ).
The system can be extended to allow a secret key holder to
generate a trapdoor on his own without any help of PKG. This
(1) If CT is the original ciphertext,
i. Verify Eq. (3). If Eq. (3) does not hold, output requires the secret key holder to know α̂, namely, α̂ is chosen
by the secret key holder as one of his secret information. We
⊥. Otherwise, proceed.
ii. If S associated with CT satisfies (M, ρ) asso- will regard the extension as one of future works.
Large Universe. To support large universe (i.e. U =
ciated with sk, there exists a set of constants
{0,
1}∗ ), we need to choose an additional TCR hash function
∗
{wi }i∈I ∈ Zq so that ∀i ∈ I, ρ(i) ∈ S and
P
H7 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , which will be operated as a random
i∈I wi Mi = (1, 0, ..., 0). Compute
oracle in the simulation. We further set ĥx = ĝ βi H7 (x) and
Y
Y
Y
Y
wi
wi
e(B, (Di
Qi,x ) )/e(
Cx ,
Ri ) hx = g βi H7 (x) for any attribute x ∈ {0, 1}∗ . We state that the
i∈I
x∈∆
i∈I
x∈∆/ρ(i)
challenger of the security game can construct the values ĥx
Q
Q
s
φi wi
ri wi
and hx as in the proof of Theorem 1 except for additionally
e(g , i∈I ĝ
( x∈∆ ĥx )
)
Q
Q
=
raising
a random value κ7 ∈R Z∗q (which is a response to the
e( x∈∆ hsx , i∈I ĝ ri wi )
query H7 on an attribute x) as an extra exponent to the values.
= e(g, ĝ)αs .
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C. Proof of the Basic Construction
For simplicity, we suppose {Hi }i∈{1,2,3,4,5,6} are TCR hash
functions (operated as oracles in the simulation), SY is a
CCA-secure one time symmetric encryption.
Theorem 1: Our S-ABPRE-KU scheme for small attribute
universe U is IND-sCCA-Or secure under the asymmetric
decisional |U |-BDHE assumption.
Proof: We assume each of the |U | attributes is a unique
integer between 1 and |U | (like [16]). If there exists a PPT
adversary A can break the IND-sCCA-Or security of our
scheme, we can construct a PPT algorithm B to break the
asymmetric decisional |U |-BDHE assumption. B is given a
problem instance of asymmetric decisional |U |-BDHE: (g, g s ,
|U |
|U |+2
2|U |
g a , ĝ, ĝ a , ..., ĝ a , ĝ a
, ..., ĝ a ,T ). In the simulation, B
obtains the following lists which are initially empty.
Secret key list sk list : record ((M, ρ), sk(M,ρ) , ∗), generated by B in the simulation, where ∗ denotes if the key
has been issued to A (yes: 1; no: 0).
list
• Re-encryption key list rk
: record ((M, ρ), S, KW ,
rk, θ1 , ∗), where ∗ is the wildcard denoting the key is
valid (“1”), random (“0”) or non-generated “⊥”.
1) Init. A outputs a challenge attribute set S ∗ to B.
2) Setup. B chooses random α0 , α̂, β1 , ...,β|U | , δ, χ, 1 ,
2 , 3 ∈ Z∗q , and sets t = g δ , t̂ = ĝ δ , z = g χ , ẑ = ĝ χ ,
f1 = g 1 , f2 = g 2 , f3 = g 3 , fˆ1 = ĝ 1 , fˆ2 = ĝ 2 ,
0
|U |
fˆ3 = ĝ 3 , e(g, ĝ)α = e(g, ĝ)α e(g a , ĝ a ) (i.e. α = α0 +
a|U |+1 ), e(g, ĝ)δα̂ = e(t, ĝ)α̂ , e(g, ĝ)ξα̂ = e(z, ĝ)α̂ , for
x ∈ [1, |U |] set ĥx = ĝ βx and hx = g βx if x ∈ S ∗
x
x
otherwise set ĥx = ĝ βx ĝ a and hx = g βx g a . B outputs
mpk as (g, ĝ, {hx , ĥx }x∈[1,|U |] , f1 , f2 , f3 , fˆ1 , fˆ2 , fˆ3 , t,
z, e(g, ĝ)α , e(t, ĝ)α̂ , e(z, ĝ)α̂ , H1 , H2 , H3 , H4 , H5 , H6 ,
SY ), where SY is a CCA-secure one-time symmetric key
encryption, and Hi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}) are the random
oracles operated by B. The msk is (α, α̂, ẑ, t̂) whereby
α is unknown to B.
a) H1 (m, σ): if the query exists on H1list in a tuple
(m, σ, κ1 ), return κ1 ; else, choose κ1 ∈R Z∗q , add
(m, σ, κ1 ) to H1list , and return H1 (m, σ) = κ1 .
b) H2 (R): if the query exists on H2list in a tuple (R, κ2 ),
return κ2 , where R ∈ GT ; else, choose κ2 ∈R
{0, 1}2λ , add (R, κ2 ) to H2list , and return H2 (R) = κ2 .
c) H3 (KW ): if the query exists on H3list in a tuple
(KW, κ3 ), return κ3 ; else, choose κ3 ∈R Z∗q , add
(KW, κ3 ) to H3list , and return H3 (KW ) = κ3 .
d) H4 (A, B, {Cx }x∈S , D, E1 ): if the query exists
on H4list in a tuple (A, B, {Cx }x∈S , D, E1 , κ4 ),
return κ4 ; else, choose κ4
∈R
Z∗q , add
list
(A, B, {Cx }x∈S , D, E1 , κ4 ) to H4 , and return
H4 (A, B, {Cx }x∈S , D, E1 ) = κ4 .
e) H5 (θ1 ): if the query exists on H5list in a tuple (θ1 , κ5 ),
return κ5 ; else, choose κ5 ∈R Z∗q , add (θ1 , κ5 ) to
H5list , and return H5 (θ1 ) = κ5 .
f) H6 (S.Key): if the query exists on H6list in a tuple (S.Key, κ6 ), return κ6 ; else, choose κ6 ∈R
λ
{0, 1}poly(1 ) , add (S.Key, κ6 ) to H6list , and return
H6 (S.Key) = κ6 .
•

3) Phase 1. A issues a series of queries.
a) Osk (M, ρ): if there is a tuple ((M, ρ), sk(M,ρ) , ∗) in
sk list , B returns sk(M,ρ) . Otherwise,
∗
• If either (M, ρ) matches S or (M, ρ) matches a S
where given a rk from (M ∗ , ρ∗ ) matching S ∗ to S,
B outputs ⊥.
• Otherwise, let K be the set of rows where the
attributes are in S ∗ (i.e. i ∈ K, ρ(i) ∈ S ∗ ) and
K 0 be the rows where attributes are not in S ∗
(i.e. K 0 = [1, l]/K), define a vector ~v = (v1 =
1, ..., vn ) ∈ Z∗n
v Mi = 0.
q , and for all i ∈ K, ~
For i ∈ K, B sets Di = Ri = ĝ 0 ; for i ∈ K 0 ,
B computes ci = ~v Mi . Note that we have to let
λi be ~v Mi α = ci α = ci (α0 + a|U |+1 ). B further
|U |+1−ρ(i)
0
sets Ri = ĝ −ci a
, Di = ĝ ci α Riβi (implicitly
set ri = −ci a|U |+1−ρ(i) , where i ∈ [1, |U |]). For
all d ∈ Γ/ρ(i), B sets Qi,d as ĥrdi = ĝ βd ri =
|U |+1−ρ(i)
d
ĝ −βd ci a
if d ∈ S ∗ and ĥrdi = ĝ βd ri ĝ a ri =
|U |+1−ρ(i)
|U |+1−ρ(i)+x
ĝ −βd ci a
ĝ −ci a
otherwise.
B will re-randomize the secret key components. B
chooses y2 , ..., yn ∈R Z∗n−1
to form a vector ~v 0 =
q
0
(0, y2 , ..., yn ), and sets λi = ~v 0 Mi , where i ∈ [1, l].
0 r0
i
For all i ∈ [1, l], B sets Di = Di ĝ λi ĥρ(i)
, Ri =
0

r0

Ri ĝ ri , ∀d ∈ Γ/ρ(i), Qi,d = Qi,d ĥdi , where ri0 ∈R
Z∗q . Finally, B adds ((M, ρ), sk(M,ρ) , 1) to sk list .
b) Otoken ((M, ρ), KW ): B knows knowledge of t̂, ẑ and
α̂, and all ĥx can be constructed from given problem
~
instance. Furthermore, B chooses a random vector V
~
with the first element α̂, and next sets φ̂i = V · Mi . It
chooses ξi , r̂i ∈R Z∗q , and next constructs the trapdoor
token τKW as in the real scheme.
c) Otest (CT, KW ): B can always construct a trapdoor
τKW as in Otoken , it next proceeds to the test easily.
If the test holds, B outputs 1 and 0 otherwise.
d) Ork ((M , ρ), S, KW ): if there is a tuple ((M, ρ), S,
KW , rk, θ1 , 0/1) in rk list , B returns rk. Otherwise,
∗
• If (M, ρ) matches S
and meanwhile, there ex0 0
ists a tuple ((M , ρ ), sk(M 0 ,ρ0 ) , 1) in sk list so that
(M 0 , ρ0 ) matches S, B outputs ⊥.
∗
• If (M, ρ) matches S
but there is no sk(M 0 ,ρ0 )
0 0
((M , ρ ) matching S) issued to A, B chooses Di ,
Ri and Qi,d randomly in G2 , i ∈ [1, l]. It further constructs the re-encryption key as in the real
scheme. B finally returns rk and adds the tuple
((M, ρ), S, KW , rk, θ1 , 0) in rk list .
• Otherwise, B first constructs the secret key sk(M,ρ)
as in Osk , and next generates rk as in the real
scheme. B adds ((M, ρ), sk(M,ρ) , 0) and ((M, ρ), S,
KW , rk, θ1 , 1) to sk list and rk list , respectively.
Note if sk(M,ρ) is already in sk list , B directly uses
it to construct rk.
e) Ore (CT, (M, ρ), S, KW ): if CT is the challenge original ciphertext, and sk(M 0 ,ρ0 ) ((M 0 , ρ0 ) satisfying S) is
issued to A, output ⊥. Else if Eq. (1), Eq. (2) and Eq.
(3) do not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, proceed. If there
exists a tuple ((M, ρ), S, KW , rk, θ1 , 0/1) in rk list ,
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B re-encrypts CT with rk. Otherwise,
• If the first case of step b) does not hold, B can
construct rk as in step b), and next generate the reencrypted ciphertext by using the re-encryption key.
Finally, B responds the ciphertext to A and adds
((M, ρ), S, KW , rk, θ1 , 0/1) to rk list .
∗
• Otherwise, i.e. for the case (M, ρ) satisfies S and
list
sk(M 0 ,ρ0 ) is in sk
with a symbol tag 1 whereby
(M 0 , ρ0 ) matches S. B checks whether there exist
tuples (m, σ, κ1 ) and (e(g, ĝ)αs , κ2 ) in H1list and
H2list , respectively, such that A = (m||σ) ⊕ κ2
and B = g κ1 . If not, output ⊥. Otherwise, B
sets Ω = e(g, ĝ)ακ1 κ5 , where κ5 is the output
of issuing H5 with θ1 ∈R {0, 1}λ . It seals θ1
in rk5 , rk6 , {rk7,x }x∈S , rk8 , rk9 as in the real
scheme. It also chooses a S.Key ∈ {0, 1}λ , and sets
T1 = S.Enc(CT ||Ω, κ6 ) where κ6 is the output of
issuing H6 with S.Key. B constructs T3 for hiding
S.Key as in the real scheme. B finally returns the
re-encrypted ciphertext T1 , T2 , T3 , and adds a tuple
((M, ρ), S, KW , ⊥, θ1 , ⊥) to rk list .
f) Odec ((M, ρ), CT ): if CT is either a challenge original
ciphertext or a derivative of the challenge ciphertext,
output ⊥. Otherwise,
• If CT is an original ciphertext, B checks Eq. (1),
Eq. (2) and Eq. (3). If the equations do not hold,
output ⊥. Else, B checks whether there exist tuples
(m, σ, κ1 ) and (e(g, ĝ)ακ1 , κ2 ) in H1list and H2list ,
respectively, such that A = (m||σ) ⊕ κ2 and B =
g κ1 , where s = κ1 . If not, output ⊥. Else, output
the message m.
• If CT is a re-encrypted ciphertext, B verifies
Eq. (4). If the equation does not hold, output
⊥. Else, B checks whether there exist tuples
(S.Key, θ3 , κ̃1 ) and (e(g, ĝ)ακ̃1 , κ̃2 ) in H1list and
H2list , respectively, such that T3,1 = (S.Key||θ3 ) ⊕
κ̃2 and T3,2 = g κ̃1 . If not, output ⊥. Else, B
H (rk ,rk ,rk ,rk )
checks e(fˆ2 4 5 6 7,x 8 fˆ3 , rk6 ) = e(ĝ, rk9 ).
If the equation does not hold, output ⊥. Else, B
checks whether there are tuples (θ1 , θ2 , κ̌1 ) and
(e(g, ĝ)ακ̌1 , κ̌2 ) in H1list and H2list , respectively,
such that rk5 = (θ1 ||θ2 ) ⊕ κ̌2 and rk6 = g κ̌1 .
If not, output ⊥. Else, B computes CT ||Ω =
S.Dec(T1 , H6 (S.Key)). It checks whether there are
tuples (m, σ, κ1 ) and (e(g, ĝ)ακ1 , κ2 ) in H1list and
H2list , respectively, such that A = (m||σ) ⊕ κ2
and B = g κ1 . If not, output ⊥. Else, B checks
Ω = e(g, ĝ)ακ1 H5 (θ1 ) . If the equation does not hold,
output ⊥; otherwise, output the message m.
4) Challenge. when Phase 1 is ended, A outputs two equal
length messages m0 , m1 and a challenge keyword KW ∗
to B. B constructs the challenge original ciphertext as
a) Set B ∗ = g s , {Cx∗ = (g s )βx }x∈S ∗ , and E1∗ = (g s )1 .
b) Flip a random coin b ∈ {0, 1}, choose σ ∗ ∈
{0, 1}λ and A∗ ∈ {0, 1}2λ , implicitly define H2 (T ·
0
e(g s , ĝ)α ) = A∗ ⊕ (mb ||σ ∗ ).
c) Issue an H3 query on (KW ∗ ) to achieve κ∗3 , and define

∗

D∗ = e(g s , ĝ)α̂(δκ3 +χ) .
d) Issue an H4 query on (A∗ , B ∗ , {Cx∗ }x∈S ∗ , D∗ , E1∗ )
∗
to achieve κ∗4 , and define E2∗ = (g s )2 κ4 (g s )3 .
e) Output the challenge original ciphertext as (S ∗ , A∗ ,
B ∗ , {Cx∗ }x∈S ∗ , D∗ , E1∗ , E2∗ ).
|U |+1
s
If T = e(g, ĝ)a
, the ciphertext is valid. However, if
T ∈R GT , the challenge ciphertext is independent of the
value of the bit b in the view of A.
5) Phase 2. Same as in Phase 1.
6) Guess. A outputs b0 . If b = b0 , B outputs 1 (guessing
|U |+1
s
T = e(g, ĝ)a
); else, it outputs 0 (T ∈R GT ).
Probability Analysis. The simulations of the oracles are
perfect except H1 and H2 . Let H1∗ and H2∗ be the events that
A has queried (mb , σ ∗ ) to H1 and e(g, ĝ)α·s to H2 before
the challenge phase, respectively. Except for the two cases,
the simulations of H1 and H2 are perfect. We let AdvH1∗ be
the probability of A in querying (mb , σ ∗ ) from H1 before the
challenge phase. Similarly, we have AdvH2∗ . In the simulations
of secret key and test, the responses to A are perfect. In the
simulation of trapdoor token, B can correctly respond any
token query with knowledge of t̂ and α̂. The response is
also perfect. As to the simulation of re-encryption key, the
responses to A are also perfect except for the case where
the re-encryption key is randomly generated. It can be seen
that rk1,i , rk2 , rk3,i and rk4,i (generated by B) can take
the form of the corresponding components of the valid reencryption key, respectively. The indistinguishability between
the random re-encryption key and the valid one is equal to the
indistinguishability between the encryption (for θ1 ) generated
by B and the one constructed in the real scheme. If there exists
a A1 can distinguish the encryptions above, B can break the
asymmetric decisional |U |-BDHE problem by using A1 . The
simulation given in the challenge phase is also perfect.
In the simulation of re-encryption, the responses to A are
perfect with an exception that A submits a valid original
ciphertext generated without issuing any query to H1 . We
denote by P r[REErr] the probability of the exception. We
have P r[REErr] ≤ qqre , where qre is the total number of
re-encryption queries.
In the simulation of decryption, it might be possible that
B cannot provide a decryption for a valid ciphertext. Suppose
A can generate a valid ciphertext without querying e(g, ĝ)αs
to H2 , where s = H1 (m, σ). Let valid be the event that
the original ciphertext or the re-encrypted ciphertext is valid,
QH1 be the event that A has queried (m, σ) to H1 and
QH2 be the event that A has queried e(g, ĝ)αs to H2 .
q
From the simulation, we have P r[valid|¬QH2 ] ≤ 2H2λ1 + 1q ,
qH2
and similarly we have P r[valid|¬QH1 ] ≤ 22λ + 1q , where
qH1 and qH2 are the maximum number of random oracle
queries to H1 and H2 . Let P r[DErr] be the probability
that the event valid|(¬QH1 ∨ ¬QH2 ) occurs, then we have
q +q
P r[DErr] ≤ ( H122λ H2 + 2q ) · qdec , where qdec denotes the
total numbers of decryption queries.
Let Bad denote the event that (H1∗ |¬H2∗ ) ∨ H2∗ ∨ REErr ∨
DErr. We have ¯ = |P r[b0 = b] − 12 | ≤ 12 P r[Bad] ≤
qH1 +(qH1 +qH2 )·qdec
1
∗
+ 2qdecq+qre ).
2 (AdvH2 +
22λ
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Therefore, we have AdvA
≥
q

+(q

+q

)·q

1
qH2

(AdvH2∗ ) ≥

(2¯
 − H1 H21 2λ H2 dec − 2qdecq+qre ).
From the simulation, the running time of B is bound by

1
qH2

t0 ≤ t + O(1)(qH1 + qH2 + qH3 + qH4 + qH5 + qH6
+ qsk + qrk + qre + qdec + qtest + qtoken )
+ te (O(l)qsk + O(l + |S|)qrk + O(|S|)qre + O(|S|)qdec
+ O(l)qtoken + qH1 (qre + qdec )O(1))
+ O(1)tp (qre + qdec + qtest ),
where qHi denotes the total number of random oracle queries
to Hi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}), qsk , qrk , qtest and qtoken denote
the total numbers of secret key queries, re-encryption key
queries, test queries and trapdoor queries, te denotes the
running time of an exponentiation in group G1 (resp. G2 ),
tp denotes the running time of a pairing in group GT , t is the
running time of A, l is the number of rows of matrix, |S| is
the number of attributes in a set S.
Theorem 2: Our S-ABPRE-KU scheme for small attribute
universe U is IND-sCCA-Re secure under the asymmetric
decisional |U |-BDHE assumption.
Proof:
1) Init. A outputs a challenge attribute set S ∗ .
2) Setup. Same as the proof of Theorem 1.
3) Phase 1.
a) Osk (M, ρ): Same as the proof of Theorem 1.
b) Otoken ((M, ρ), KW ): Same as the proof of Theorem 1.
c) Otest (CT, KW ): Same as the proof of Theorem 1.
d) Ork ((M , ρ), S, KW ): Same as the proof of Theorem 1.
e) Ore (CT, (M, ρ), S, KW ): Same as the proof of Theorem 1 except that there is no restriction for query (the
issued ciphertext CT has to be in a valid form) here.
f) Odec ((M, ρ), CT ): Same as the proof of Theorem 1
except that CT can be any ciphertext but not the
challenge re-encrypted ciphertext.
4) Challenge. A outputs m0 , m1 , KW ∗ and (M, ρ) that
does not satisfy S ∗ . B sets the challenge re-encrypted
ciphertext as follows.
a) Generate a secret key sk(M,ρ) as in Osk , and next
∗
∗
construct a re-encryption key rk ∗ = (rk1,i
, rk2∗ , rk3,i
,
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
rk4,i , rk5 , rk6 , {rk7,x }x∈S ∗ , rk8 , rk9 ) from (M, ρ)
to S ∗ under KW ∗ as in the real scheme.
b) Generate an original ciphertext CT as in the real
0
scheme A∗ = (mb ||σ) ⊕ κ2 , B ∗ = g s , {Cx∗ =
0
s0
∗
α̂(δκ3 +χ)s0
∗
hx }x∈S , D = e(g, ĝ)
, E1 = f1s , E2∗ =
κ4
s0
(f2 f3 ) , where b ∈ {0, 1}, σ ∈R {0, 1}λ , s0 =
H1 (mb , σ), S is the attribute set satisfying (M, ρ),
κ2 , κ3 , κ4 are the output of issuing oracles H2 , H3 ,
0
H4 with e(g, ĝ)αs , KW , (A∗ , B ∗ , {Cx }∗ , D∗ , E1∗ ),
respectively. Note hx , t, f1 , f2 and f3 can be constructed by B.
c) Re-encrypt CT with rk to obtain Ω∗ as in the real
scheme. Since CT and rk are correctly constructed, Ω∗
λ
is a valid value here. Choose S.Key ∈ {0, 1}poly(1 ) ,

compute T1∗ = S.Enc(CT ||Ω∗ , κ6 ), where κ6 is the
output of issuing oracle H6 with S.Key.
∗
∗
d) Set T3,2
= g s and {T3,3,x
= (g s )βx }x∈S ∗ .
∗
λ
∗
e) Choose θ3 ∈ {0, 1} and T3,1
∈ {0, 1}2λ , implicitly
s
α0
∗
define H2 (T · e(g , ĝ) ) = T3,1 ⊕ (S.Key||θ3∗ ).
∗
∗
∗
f) Issue an H4 query on (T3,1
, T3,2
, T3,3,x
) to achieve κ∗4 ,
∗
s 2 κ∗
s

and define T3,4 = (g ) 4 (g ) 3 .
∗
g) Set T2∗ = (rk5∗ , rk6∗ , {rk7,x
}x∈S ∗ , rk8∗ , rk9∗ ), and
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
T3 = (T3,1 , T3,2 , T3,3,x , T3,4 ).
h) Output the challenge ciphertext (S ∗ , T1∗ , T2∗ , T3∗ ).
|U |+1
s
If T = e(g, ĝ)a
, the ciphertext is valid by implicitly
letting H1 (S.Key, θ3∗ ) = s. However, if T ∈R GT , the
challenge ciphertext is independent of the value of the bit
b in the view of A.
5) Phase 2. Same as in Phase 1.
6) Guess. A outputs a guess bit b0 . If b = b0 , B outputs 1
|U |+1
s
(guessing T = e(g, ĝ)a
); else, it outputs 0 (guessing
T ∈R GT ).
The probability analysis and running time calculation are
identical to that of the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 3: Our S-ABPRE-KU scheme for small attribute
universe U is keyword private under the asymmetric decisional
|U |-BDHE assumption.
Proof: If there exists a PPT adversary A can break the
keyword privacy of our scheme, we can construct a PPT
algorithm B to break the asymmetric mDBDH assumption.
B is given a problem instance of the problem: (g, g s , g a , ĝ,
|U |
|U |+2
2|U |
ĝ a , ..., ĝ a , ĝ a
, ..., ĝ a ,T ). In the simulation, B obtains
the following lists which are initially empty.
List sk list : record ((M, ρ), sk(M,ρ) ).
list
• List rk
: record ((M, ρ), S, KW, rk).
1) Init. A outputs a challenge attribute set S ∗ .
2) Setup. B chooses random α̂0 , α, β1 , ...,β|U | , δ, χ, 1 ,
2 , 3 ∈ Z∗q , and sets t = g δ , t̂ = ĝ δ , z = g χ , ẑ = ĝ χ ,
f1 = g 1 , f2 = g 2 , f3 = g 3 , fˆ1 = ĝ 1 , fˆ2 = ĝ 2 ,
0
|U |
fˆ3 = ĝ 3 , e(g, ĝ)α , e(g δ , ĝ)α̂ e(g aδ , ĝ a ) = e(t, ĝ)α̂ (i.e.
0
|U |
α̂ = α̂0 + a|U |+1 ), e(g χ , ĝ)α̂ e(g aχ , ĝ a ) = e(z, ĝ)α̂ , for
x ∈ [1, |U |] set ĥx = ĝ βx and hx = g βx if x ∈ S ∗
x
x
otherwise set ĥx = ĝ βx ĝ a and hx = g βx g a . B outputs
mpk as (g, ĝ, {hx , ĥx }x∈[1,|U |] , f1 , f2 , f3 , fˆ1 , fˆ2 , fˆ3 , t,
z, e(g, ĝ)α , e(t, ĝ)α̂ , e(z, ĝ)α̂ , H1 , H2 , H3 , H4 , H5 , H6 ,
SY ), where SY is a CCA-secure one-time symmetric key
encryption, and Hi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}) are the random
oracles operated by B. The msk is (α, α̂, ẑ, t̂) whereby
α̂ is unknown to B.
3) Phase 1.
a) Osk (M, ρ): since B has knowledge of α and hρ(i) , it
can construct secret key corresponding to any (M, ρ),
and next adds the tuple to sk list . When (M, ρ) satisfies
S ∗ , output ⊥.
b) Otoken ((M, ρ), KW ): if (M, ρ) matches S ∗ , B outputs
⊥. Else, B is able to set τ2,i and τ3,i,d as in Osk of
the proof of Theorem 1 with the exception that ri =
−(δH3 (KW )+χ)ci a|U |+1−ρ(i) , and further computes
0
(δH (KW )+χ)βi
τ1,i as ĝ (δH3 (KW )+χ)ci α Ri 3
, where δ, χ
are known to B. B next re-randomizes the elements as
•
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in the real scheme, and finally outputs τKW .
c) Otest (CT, KW ): if the attribute set S associated with
CT is S ∗ , B outputs ⊥. Else, B can always compute a
trapdoor τKW as in Otoken , it next proceeds to the test
easily. If the test holds, B outputs 1 and 0 otherwise.
d) Ork ((M , ρ), S, KW ): if there is a tuple ((M, ρ), S,
KW , rk) in rk list , B returns rk. Otherwise,
•

•

If (M, ρ) matches S ∗ and meanwhile, there exists a
tuple ((M 0 , ρ0 ), sk(M 0 ,ρ0 ) ) in sk list so that (M 0 , ρ0 )
matches S, B outputs ⊥.
Otherwise, B first constructs the secret key sk(M,ρ)
as in Osk , and next generates rk as in the real
scheme. B adds ((M, ρ), S, KW , rk) to sk list and
rk list finally.

e) Ore (CT, (M, ρ), S, KW ): if C is the challenge original ciphertext, and sk(M 0 ,ρ0 ) ((M 0 , ρ0 ) satisfying S) is
issued to A, output ⊥. Else if Eq. (1), Eq. (2) and Eq.
(3) do not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, proceed. If there
exists a tuple ((M, ρ), S, KW , rk) in rk list , B reencrypts CT with rk. Otherwise, B first generates a reencryption key by using the secret key of the delegator
(with knowledge of α), next constructs the re-encrypted
ciphertext as in the real scheme.
f) Odec ((M, ρ), CT ): if CT is either a challenge original
ciphertext or a derivative of the challenge ciphertext,
output ⊥. Otherwise, B can uses the knowledge of α
to construct the corresponding secret key to recover m
as in the real scheme.
4) Challenge. A outputs m∗ , KW1∗ and KW0∗ . B sets the
original challenge ciphertext as
a) Set B ∗ = g s , {Cx∗ = (g s )βx }x∈S ∗ , and E1∗ = (g s )1 .
b) Choose σ ∗ ∈ {0, 1}λ and set A∗ = (m∗ ||σ ∗ ) ⊕
H2 (e(g s , ĝ)α ).
c) Issue an H3 query on (KWb∗ ) to achieve κ∗3 , flip
a random coin b ∈ {0, 1}, and define D∗ =
0
∗
∗
e(g s , ĝ)α̂ (δκ3 +χ) T δκ3 +χ .
d) Issue an H4 query on (A∗ , B ∗ , {Cx∗ }x∈S ∗ , D∗ , E1∗ )
∗
to achieve κ∗4 , and define E2∗ = (g s )2 κ4 (g s )3 .
e) Output the challenge original ciphertext as (S ∗ , A∗ ,
B ∗ , {Cx∗ }x∈S ∗ , D∗ , E1∗ , E2∗ ).
|U |+1
s
If T = e(g, ĝ)a
, the ciphertext is valid by implicitly
∗
∗
setting H1 (m , σ ) = s. However, if T ∈R GT , the
challenge ciphertext is independent of the value of the
bit b in the view of A.
We note that the keyword privacy also keeps in the reencrypted ciphertext. The construction approach of the
challenge re-encrypted ciphertext is somewhat identical to
the above ciphertext with the exception: B can construct
the original ciphertext CT as in the real scheme as well
as Ω, T1 and T3 , it further embeds g s and T into rk5 ,
rk6 , rk7,x , rk8 and rk9 .
5) Phase 2. Same as in Phase 1.
6) Guess. A outputs a guess bit b0 . If b = b0 , B outputs 1
|U |+1
s
(guessing T = e(g, ĝ)a
); else, it outputs 0 (guessing
T ∈R GT ).
The probability analysis is identical to the previous one.

V. E FFICIENCY C OMPARISON
A. Theoretical Analysis
We compare our scheme with an ABKS (the concrete keypolicy ABKS scheme) [38] and an ABPRE [19] in terms
of computation and communication cost. Table II shows the
comparison of computational cost, and Table III shows the
communication comparison.
We now define the notations used in the Tables. Let |G| and
|GT | denote the bit-length of an element in groups G1 (resp.
G2 ) and GT , |St| denote the number of state in a deterministic
finite automaton, l is the number of row of a matrix, |W |
denote the length of a string, |T L| denote the number of leaf
in an access tree, |S| denote the number of attribute in an
attribute set, λ denote the security parameter and its length |λ|,
p, e(1) , e(2) denote the computation cost of a bilinear pairing,
an exponentiation in G1 (resp. G2 ), and an exponentiation
in GT , respectively. For comparison convenience, we suppose
our scheme is also in symmetric pairings group, i.e. G1 = G2 .
Table II shows that our scheme is the most efficient one
in decryption and search (enjoying constant pairings cost),
while [38] and [19] suffer from linearly cost, i.e. O(|S|) and
O(|St|) pairings, respectively. Compared with [19], our system
only requires constant pairings cost in re-encryption phase.
Although our scheme needs O(l2 ) exponentiations in G in
the generation of trapdoor token, it enjoys better performance
in keyword search, re-encryption and decryption phases.
TABLE III
C OMMUNICATION C OMPARISON WITH [38], [19]

Sch.
[38]
[19]
Ours

Ciphertext (Or)

Size/Length
Token

Secret Key

O(|S|)|G|

O(|T L|)|G|

O(|T L|)|G|

O(1)|GT | + O(|W |)|G|

⊥
O(l2 )|G|

O(|St|)|G|
O(l2 )|G|

O(|S|)|G| + O(1)|λ|

Table III shows that our scheme has similar complexity
with [38] in the size of ciphertext though it needs O(l2 )
elements in G for the token and secret key.
In conclusion, our scheme achieves more practical functionalities (including keyword search, data sharing and keyword
update) without requiring a great amount of additional computation and communication cost.
B. Practical Analysis
For the system simulation, we leverage the Java Pairing
Based Cryptography Library [28] to calculate the system
running time shown in Table IV. Our testbed is: Intel(R)
Core(TM)2 Quad CPU Q6600 @ 2.40GHz, 3 GB RAM,
Ubuntu 10.04; pairing type is a with 160-bit group oder
(supersingular curve Y 2 = X 3 + X). We also assume all
systems only make one time operation for the (equal length)
keyword update, ciphertext share and search, respectively.
Besides, we suppose the schemes must at least achieve a
security level comparable to a symmetric key cryptosystem
with an 80-bit key. An elliptic curve cryptosystem with 160bit keys is needed. Therefore, we set |λ| = 160 bits, |G| = 160
bits and |GT | = 1024 bits, respectively. We further set
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TABLE II
C OMPUTATION C OMPARISON WITH [38], [19]

Sch.
[38]
[19]
Ours

Computation Cost
Search

Enc

Token Gen

ReEnc

Dec (Or)

O(|S|)e(1)
O(|W |)e(1) + O(1)e(2)

O(|T L|)e(1)

O(|S|)p + O(|S|)e(2)

⊥

⊥

⊥

⊥
O(l2 )e(1)

⊥
O(|S|)e(1) + O(1)p

O(|W |)e(1) + O(1)e(2) + O(|St|)p

O(|St|)p

O(|St|)p

O(1)p

O(1)p

O(1)p

O(|S|)e(1) + O(1)e(2)

|S| = |T L| = l = 50, |W | = 50, |St| = 51 and each state
in St can be a successful state. This initialization indicates
that an attribute set shares the same number of attributes in
an access tree, and each row of the Matrix (used to represent
access policy) corresponds to a distinct attribute (where the
total number of attribute is also 50). Table V is the comparison
of concrete communication cost.
TABLE IV
C OMPARISON IN S YSTEM RUNNING T IME

Sch.

Enc

[38]
[19]
Ours

940.52
436.68
153.60

Token
Gen
1869.92
⊥
7364.35

Algorithms (ms)
Search
ReEnc
1494.71
⊥
958.71

⊥
2708.05
1161.36

Dec
(Or)
⊥
2242.06
1888.11

Dec
(Re)
⊥
4502.71
3778.40

TABLE V
C OMPARISON IN C OMMUNICATION C OST

Sch.
[38]
[19]
Ours

Components Length (bit)
Ciphertext (Or)
Token
Secret Key
8480
16320
10600
17984
⊥
26818
1984
408000
408000

In summary, we can see from Table IV and Table V that our
system enjoys better computational efficiency in each metric
except token generation, and meanwhile, we need a larger
space to store our keyword search token compared to others.
We state that how to reduce the size of keyword token and
its corresponding computational cost is an interesting open
problem, which is regarded as one of our future works.
VI. C ONCLUSIONS
We defined a new notion searchable attribute-based proxy
re-encryption with keyword update, and proposed a concrete
construction satisfying the notion. We also proved the new
scheme CCA secure in the ROM. The scheme is the first
of its type to integrate searchable attribute-based encryption
with attribute-based proxy re-encryption, which is applicable
to many real-world applications.
Although the new system enjoys its valuable advantages, it
motivates some interesting open problems, e.g., how to reduce
the size of search token, how to allow a secret key holder to
generate search token individually, and how to provide more
expressive keyword search.

Dec (Re)
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